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DECISIONS.

In the United States District Court.
WILLIAM B. SMITH VS. THE MILWAUKEE AND SUPERIOR RAILROAD COMPANY, THE CITY OF MILWAUKEE, AND JOHN H. TESCH, TREASURER.

1. An Act of a State Legislature, authorizing a city to issue its bonds in aid of railroad companies incorporated and organized, does not extend to companies afterwards incorporated.
2. Where a city issues its bonds in aid of a railroad company without authority of
law, and receives therefor the bonds of the company, secured with other bonos
by a mortgage upon its road, the city is not such a lien creditor for a valuable
consideration as to entitle it to claim a share of the proceeds of the sale of ihe
mortgaged premises made in ratification of the mortgage. But the city having
received securities collateral to the company's bonds, a judgment creditor of the
company cannot, by bill in equity, require the city to surrender these securities
until its rights are determined by judicial proceeding, or it be released.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
MILLER, J.

This is a bill in equity. The complainant
obtained a judgment iii this Court against the Railroad Company,
defendant, and issued afierifacias,which was returned unsatisfied.
The bill charges.that the city has in its possession, or under its
control, notes and mortgages upon real estate to the amount of
fifty thousand dollars, made and executed by divers persons to the
company, which the company transferred to the city without consideration, and that should be applied to the debts of the company.
The company made no defence. The answer of the city and John
H. Tesch, the treasurer, sets forth the acts of the Legislature,
under which, it is alleged, the city had lawful authority for issuing
its bonds to the amount of one hundred thousand dollars to the
company in aid of its work, and also the ordinances of the City
Council ordering the issue of the bonds; and, in consideration
thereof, the company gave the city its own bonds, with the said
notes and farm mortgages as collateral security. It is alleged that
the company is insolvent; that the bonds of the city were issued,
payable to the company or bearer, with negotiable coupons annexed; that the company negotiated these bonds for a valuable
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consideration to persons unknown ; that the bonds are not yet payable, and there are coupons unpaid ; that the road of the company
has been sold in satisfaction of a mortgage ; and that the operations of the company have ceased. These facts are not controverted.
The bonds of the city beat date the first day of January, eighteen
hundred and fifty-seven, are payable to the Milwaukee and Superior
Railroad Company, or bearer, and recite that they are "issued in
pursuance of an ordinance of the Common Council of the City of
Milwaukee, entitled 'An Ordinance authorizing an issue of city
bonds to the Milwaukee and Superior Railroad,' passed June 16,
1856, and approved by the legal voters of said city of Milwaukee,
at an election for that purpose, on the 4th day of August, 1856 ;
and of an Act of the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, entitled ' An Act authorizing the City of Milwaukee to loan its credit
in aid of certain railroads,' approved April 2, A. D. 1853, and of
the several acts amendatory thereto."
The act described in the bonds authorizing the Common Council
of the City of Milwaukee to loan the credit of the city by " issuing
its bonds to aid in the construction of certain railroads leading
from the said city, and particularly the Green Bay, Milwaukee and
Chicago Railroad ComTany, the Milwaukee and Fond du Lac Railroad Company, and the La Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company-companies duly incorporated and organized: Provided,that
there shall be loaned to either of said companies an amount not
exceeding two hundred thousand dollars, nor, in the aggregate, an
amount exceeding six hundred thousand dollars. And no bonds
shall be delivered to any railroad company until at least ten miles
of that portion of road mortgaged to the city by such company, to
secure the payment of such bonds, shall have been constructed by
such company ; nor, thereafter, shall they be delivered faster than
the work of construction of such portion of said road shall progress,
nor shall there, at any time, be delivered to such company more
than five thousand dollars in value of bonds for every mile of such
portion of road constructed ; but such bonds may issue, provided
other equivalent securities shall be furnished in lieu thereof."
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An act in addition to an act, authorizing the city of Milwaukee to
loan its credit in aid of certain railroads, approved July 12, 1853,
provided the first-named act shall include the Milwaukee and Watertown Railroad Company, and other railroad companies duly incorporated and organized for the purpose of constructing railroads
leading from the City of Milwaukee into the interior of the State,
which, in the opinion of the Common Council, are entitled to aid
from the city. The amount of bonds allowed to be issued to each
company is limited, in this act, to two hundred thousand dollars,
and the aggregate amount is limited to one million; and the question of issuing the bonds is to be first submitted to a vote of the
voters of the city.
The Milwaukee and Watertown Railroad Company was incorporated by an act approved March 11, 1851, and was organized before
the date of the last act.
The Milwaukee and Superior Railroad Company was incorporated by an act approved March 4, 1856. This company was incorporated for the purpose of constructing a road north from Milwaukee to Green Bay; and, by section twenty-six of the charter, "all
the powers, rights, privileges, and franchises heretofore granted
and conferred upon the Green Bay, Milwaukee and Chicago Railroad Company by an act incorporating that company, approved
March, 1851, and the several acts in addition thereto or amendatory of the same, so far as the same relate to or authorize the location or construction of a railroad north of the depot of the Green
Bay, Milwaukee and Chicago Railroad Company in the City of
Milwaukee, are, with the consent of the last-mentioned company,
taken from it and transferred to the company then incorporated."
The city claiming a portion of the proceeds of the sale made
under the mortgage of the company to the Farmers' Loan and
Trust Company of New York, I delivered, the following opinion,
disallowing the claim:
"By reference to the ordinance of the Common Council of the
City of Milwaukee, it appears that by an ordinance passed April
80, 1853, and adopted by the legal voters May 19, 1853, city
bonds were authorized to be issued to the Green Bay, Milwaukee
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and Chicago Railroad Company, not exceeding in amount two hundred thousand dollars. By an ordinance passed the same day, a
similar amount of bonds were authorized to be issued to the La
Crosse and Milwaukee Railroad Company. And by another ordinance, passed on the same day, a similar amount to the Milwaukee
and Fond du Lac Railroad Company. These several ordinances
authorize bonds to be issued on the terms and conditions specified
in an act authorizing the city of Milwaukee to loan its credit in aid
of certain railroads, approved April 2, 1853, and on the terms and
conditions therein provided. These appropriations to the three
companies mentioned in the act amount to six hundred thousand
dollars, the extent of the sum authorized by the act; and they
exhausted the power granted by the act to the Common Council.
And from this, it may be inferred that the act was not so construed
as to include any other companies than those expressed."
"The act of July 12, 1853, included the Milwaukee and Watertown Railroad Company, (which had been incorporated and organized previous to the act of April 2, 1853,) and any other railroad
company duly incorporated and organized for the purpose of constructing railroads leading from the city of Milwaukee. This is
the only act supplementary to the act of April, 1853, referred to
in the city bonds. The only company mentioned in this act is the
Milwaukee and Watertown Railroad Company. Whether there
were any other companies of the description then incorporated and
organized, I need not inquire. The Milwaukee and Superior Railroad Company was not then incorporated and organized; and it
could not have been contemplated by the Legislature, as a company
was then incorporated for constructing a road to Green Bay, and
which was specially mentioned in the act of April, 1853. Grants
of power are to be construed literally; and legislative grants are
not to be so construed as to include subjects not in existence, nor
not created in the grant, nor specially provided for, if created in
future. This act must necessarily relate to companies incorporated
and organized at the date of its approval.
"There is not the least reference in the act to companies thereafter incorporated and organized, but the letter of the act grants
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the power expressly to issue bonds to companies then incorporated
and organized. There is no room for construing the act so as to
include companies to be thereafter incorporated and organized."
"It is well understood that a legislative grant of authority to
the Common Council to issue the bonds was necessary to their
validity. For this reason the acts are recited in the bonds under
which the Common Council issued them. These acts are public,
and it is the duty of every person dealing in those bonds to refer
to them. They form the basis of the contract, and the purchaser
of the bonds is charged with knowledge of them.
"The bonds were issued to the railroad company, and receipted
for, in two parcels of fifty thousand dollars each, in the month of
March, 1857. In this respect the Common Council did not comply with the expressed directions of the act of April, 1853, to issue
the bonds in proportion as the building of the road progressed; but
they accepted the bonds of the company included in the mortgage,
in return for the city bonds. If there are any purchasers for a
valuable consideration of the city bonds, they are justly to be
deemed equally as reckless of their own interests as the Common
Council were of those of the inhabitants of the city.
"By the acts under which these bonds purport to be issued, the
inhabitants of the city are subjected to taxation for the payment of
principal and interest. For this reason it is right that the legality
of the bonds should be ascertained and settled ; for the people will
not consent to be taxed for the payment of an unauthorized and
illegal debt, particularly when they have cause to feel that the city
authorities have not been guardians of their interests."
In that case, I considered that the bonds of the city had been
issued without lawful authority, and that the property of the people could not be lawfully taxed for their payment, upon failure of
the company to indemify or release the city. And it was thought
that, by granting the application of the city, the matter might become more complicated and more embarrassing to the city and its
inhabitants. I thought that the city had not an equal right with
the bondholders to receive upon the mortgage, as a lien, a portion
of the proceeds of sale. But this case is an adverse suit, instituted
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by a creditor of the company, to compel the city to surrender up
to him the securities specially deposited with it for its indemnity. As it respects those securities in the possession of the city,
this complainant stands on no better footing than the railroad company. This proceeding, which is an attachment in equity, does not
give complainant any right to a decree against the city for the surrender of the securities, if the company has no right to demand
their return.
The company became insolvent, after negotiating for a large
sum of money the bonds of the city advanced for its benefit. The
city stands as surety of the company; and by the receipt of the
securities in the character of a trustee -in equity so far as to entitle the bondholders to claim them. Although the city bonds are
issued without an existing statute expressly authorizing it, yet
they were issued in pursuance of an ordinance of the ciiy, which
may be legalize( upon application of the city authorities, or be
confirmed by acts of the inhabitants. They may consent to be
taxed for the payment of the bonds; but it is not very probable
that they will. We cannot tell what may happen before the bonds
become payable. The city is liable to be sued, and put to expense in defending suits upon coupons, and upon the bonds after
they become payable. The Court cannot deprive the city of its
indemnity against these expenses; nor can the Court say to the
city authorities that they shall take advantage of the defect of
authority for issuing the bonds. The city is not here in this case,
in such a position as to authorize the Court in passing judgment
against it, to that extent. The Court can make no order in this
case, affecting the rights of holders of the city bonds, or preventing them from setting up an equitable claim to the securities.
The holders of these bonds having, for a valuable consideration
paid the company for them, would, in equity, be entitled to follow
the securities, if the city should not be damnified. They would
have a superior equity to that claimed by complainant. Equity
would reimburse them out of those securities, for the money they
actually paid the company for the city bonds with interest,
although the bonds may have been issued without lawful authority.
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At all events, the city has a right to retain the securities until its
liabilities and rights are judicially determined upon some proceeding on the part of the bondholders, and until then, judgment
creditors of the company cannot interfere.
The case of -Parker vs. .Rochester, 4 Johns. Oh. Rep. 329, is
similar in principle to this one. The endorser of negotiable notes
received a judgment of indemnity from the maker; and the notes
being negotiated with the Utica Insurance Company, the endorsement was void, as the company was prohibited by a law of the
State of New York from doing that kind of business. The complainant, as a judgment creditor of the maker of the notes, filed
the bill to remove the lien of the judgment in favor of the endorser, upon the alleged ground of want of consideration, the
plaintiff in the judgment not being legally liable to loss or injury
in consequence of his endorsement. The chancellor did not consider that a third person, although a creditor, had any equitable
right to interfere in the contract between a debtor and his surety;
or to remove the surety's indemnity even when he was not legally
bound, nor legally liable to loss. Also in cases upon contracts
void for usury, the surety is not legally subject to loss, but his
indemnity cannot be taken from him until his liability is judicially
determined. See also 1 Vern. 190; 2 John. Ch. Rep. 561;
cfKinney vs. Boss, 2 Rawle, 229.
Being satisfied that complainant is not entitled to the decree
prayed for in his bill, it must be dismissed as to the city of Milwaukee and John H. Tesch, the Treasurer.

-In the United States District Court, fissouri.
IN THE MIATTER 0? EMMET MCDONALD.
1. A United States District Judge, or a United States District Court, has jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus, and hear the case when the petitioner is
held under illegal restraint, without any formal or technical commitment.
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2. The writ of habeas corpus may issue from a Federal judge whenever the applicant is illegally restrained of his liberty, under or by color of the authority of the
United States, and such case is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Federal
tribunals.
3. The question of jurisdiction is to be determined by the Acts of Congress and the
decisions of the Supreme Court, the Circuit Courts, and the District Courts of the
United States, thereupon.
4. The construction and interpretation of the Acts of Congress of September 24,
1789, Sect. 14, of March 2, 1838, Sect. 7.
5. The history of the habeas corpus, under the Judiciary Acts and the Force Bill, as
drawn from the adjudicated cases, given and explained.
6. The adjudicated cases on the habeas corpus in the Supreme Court, in the Circuit
Courts, and in the District Courts of the United States, cited, and commented on.

The opinion of the Court, on the question of jurisdiction, was
delivered by
TREAT, J.-Since the adjournment, as thorough an examination of authorities as practicable has been made, with the view of
arriving at a correct conclusion upon the jurisdictional question
presented.
Every authority cited by the learned counsel, and their able arguments, have been carefully considered. The question, though one
of pure law, involves an inquiry into the United States Constitution and statutes, the organization of the United States Courts, the
power vested in United States Judges, and the sources of American
jurisprudence. In the hasty preparation of an opinion taking so
wide a range, it is not to be expected that much labor has been
bestowed upon logical order or method, or mere forms of expression.
The important consideration is to reach a correct conclusion. The
undivided attention of the Court, therefore, has been fixed upon the
single proposition submitted. With other points or issues, which
may or may not be reached in the further prosecution of this cause,
the Court, at this time, has nothing to do.
The case stands, at present, on a demurrer to the return. The counsel for the respondent has suggested a question of jurisdiction;
and, as that question always lies in limine, it is right and proper
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that it should be first considered. As a preliminary step, then, it
must be determined whether the Court has jurisdiction-whether it
can proceed any further in the matter before it; for, most certainly, when asked to pass upon the authority of others, official or
otherwise, it should be scrupulously careful not to exceed its own
legal powers. The duty to decide what the law is, in each case before it, and to enforce its decisions for the maintenance of constitutional and legal authority in whomever vested, for the time
being, is no less imperative than to protect the humblest rights of
persons and property. Every officer of the Government, and every
private citizen, is alike entitled to the full measure of protection
furnished by law, and is alike responsible to it for every violation
of its mandates. In its administration, there is no inequality-all
stand before it on the same level.
Has a United States District Judge, or a United States District
Court, jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus and hear the
case, when the petitioner is held under illegal restraint without any
formal or technical "1commitment ?" Is it not essential to such
jurisdiction that the petitioner should be in jail, or imprisoned by
virtue of some judgment, warrant, order, rule, or process, judicial
or otherwise-or, at least, be so held 1 under restraint ?" Or, on
the other hand, is it sufficient that he is illegally restrained of his
liberty "under or by color of the authority of the United States,"
irrespective of the fact whether there has been a technical "commitment" or not? In short, is this case one of Federal or exclusively State jurisdiction ?
The petition, on which the writ was issued, avers substantially,
that the petitioner is now, and has been since the 10th inst., held
in unlawful confinement within the United States Arsenal in this
city, a military post under the command of the respondent; that he
is so held under no writ, process, judgment, decree, committal, or
order of any State Court, or State officer, or by virtue of any State
law, proceeding, or power, civil or military; that, "on the contrary,
his saidillegalconfinement is under or by color of the authority of the
United States;" and that said unlawful confinement is by no order,

IN THE MATTER OF EMMET McDONALD.

judgment, decree, or committal of any judicial tribunal of the
United States, nor in virtue of any writ or process issuing therefrom. The petition then sets out the facts and circumstances connected with his caption, which are unimportant at this stage of the
case, inasmuch as they do not qualify, in any manner, the direct
averments above mentioned. Hence the jurisdictional question is
free from all technicalities pertaining to careless use of language,
for the averments are full and precise. It becomes a fundamental
question, then, in the case, and must be directly and fairly met at
the very threshold.
i
Nothing has, in many cases, been more perplexing to American
jurists than a correct definition of the exact limits, or the ascertainment of the true boundaries, between Federal and State jurisdiction. In some classes of cases, Federaljurisdiction is exclusive;
in some, State jurisdiction; whilst in others the Federal and State
judiciary have concurrent authority. The dividing line is not
always to be readily ascertained.
The whole power vested by the United States Constitution in the
Federal judiciary has never yet been called into potential or full
force and activity; nor have the necessary statutes been passed to
give vital and practical energy to all of the grants of power concerning any of the three great departments of the Government.
The Courts are, therefore, compelled to pass upon each case separately, as it arises, limiting their decisions to the particular facts
before them. In the organization of the United States District
Courts, Congress has defined the portion of judicial power with
which they are entrusted: 4 Dall. 8, Turner vs. The.Bankof North
America. Beyond that limit they cannot pass: 1 Kent, 294.
It is not whether Congress could not have vested in them larger
powers ; but simply what authority has actually been entrusted to
them. Hence, in each instance, recurrence must be had to the
United States statutes ; and, if those statutes are within the grants
of the Constitution, the means are at hand for settling the controversy. No actual or apprehended conflict between the State and
Federal authority exists in this case; yet the inquiry is just as

IN THE MATTER OF EMMET McDONALD.

appropriate concerning the extent of power really vested in this
tribunal. Every public officer-whether executive, ministerial, or
legislative-has to decide for himself, in the first instance, the true
extent of his authority, subject always, in free governments, to a
lawful revision of his acts in every case which may involve their
validity. So is it, most unquestionably, with judicial officers and
Courts. Hence Acts of Congress have been solemnly pronounced
unconstitutional and void; executive mandates condemned as in
contravention, or without authority of law; ministerial proceedings,
supposed legal for a time, finally adjudged trespasses ; and judicial
decisions overruled and annulled by superior judicial tribunals. Yet
there is no instability in all this ; it is merely an assertion of the
fundamental principle of free government, viz: the supremacy of law.
A thorough knowledge of the law, applicable to each case, and implicitly followed, would render all conflict of legal authority almost
an impossibility. It is only necessary, therefore, to avoid conflicts,
for citizens, whether acting in their private or official capacity, to
understand correctly their legal rights and duties-to comprehend
fully that, in all the varied and shifting exigencies of public and
private affairs, law is still supreme-the source of all legitimate
authority, the only power no one can disobey with impunity, to
which all are subject, and which all have an equal right to invoke
for the maintenance of their lives, liberties, and property. No one
in this land is so exalted as to be above its restraining force, and
none so humble as to be beneath its protecting care. Were it otherwise, lawlessness would dominate, anarchy follow, and liberty itself
be impossible, for "there can be no liberty save in the harness of
the law." "When the law ceases to be the test of right and remedy
-when individuals undertake to be its administrators by rules of
their own adoption-the bonds of society are broken. Thefirst duty
of citizens in a government of laws is obedience to its ordinances:"
Baldwin's Rep. 591, Johnson vs. Tompkins. Foremost of all
should be the tribunals of law, to keep strictly within legal limits.
Whilst fearless in the exercise of lawful power, they should be scrupulously vigilant not to exceed the legal boundaries set to their
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action. They minister at a sacred altar, and with religious fidelity
must they be true to their trust. They can yield nothing, and must
assume nothing. Like the Supreme Court of the United States,
they " must grasp at nothing-shrink from nothing." In this
spirit the Courts should always act, and in modern times have generally acted. Hence it is that jurisdictional questions occupy so
large a portion of judicial inquiry; and well is it that such has been
the fact, for the conclusions thus reached enable others to recur to
the past for its calm solution of propositions, which excitements of
a subsequent hour might distort or color with passion or prejudice.
The language of Judge Cranch (1 Cranch, Circuit Court Rep.
379) is especially instructive, because, in the very case in which he
gave utterance to such correct thoughts, he was overruled by his
colleagues, but sustained, on review, by the United States Supreme
Court:
"In times like these, when the public mind is agitaied-when wars and rumors
of wars, plots, conspiracies and treasons excite alarm-it is the duty of a Court to
be peculiarly watchful, lest the public feeling should reach the seat of justice, and
thereby precedents be established which may become the ready tools of faction in
times more disastrous. The worst of precedents may be established from the best
of motives. We ought to be upon our guard, lest our zeal for the public interest
lead us to overstep the bounds of the law and the Constitution ; for, although we
may thereby bring one criminal to punishment, we may furnish the means by which
a hundred innocent persons may suffer. The Constitution was made for times of
commotion. In the calm of peace and prosperity, there is seldom great injustice.
Dangerous precedents occur in dangerous times. It then becomes the duty of the
judiciary calmly to poise the scales of justice, unmoved by the arm of power, undisturbed by the clamor of the multitude. Whenever an application is made to us
in our, judicial character, we are bound, not only by the nature of our office, but by
our solemn oaths, to administer justice according to the laws and Constitution of
the United States. No political motives, no reasons of state, can justify a disregard of that solemn injunction. In cases of emergency, it is for the Executive
department of the Government to act upon its own responsibility, and to rely upon
the necessity of the case for its justification ; but this Court is bound by the law
and the Constitution in all events. When, therefore, the Constitution declares that
' the right of the people to be secure in their persons' ' against unreasonable seizures,' ' shall not be violated,' and that ' no warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation,' this Court is as much bound as any individual magistrate to obey its command."
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These truths, though elementary, are too apt to be overlooked.
No apology is necessary for recurring to them at this time.
Fir t: As to the right and duty of every Court to decide upon
the extent of its own jurisdiction, and the duty of every party upon
whom process is served to appear in obedience thereto :
"Every day and in every Court, writs issue at the instance of parties asserting a
grievance, and very often when, in truth, no grievance has been sustained. The
party assailed comes before the Court in obedience to its process. He perhaps
questions thejurisdictionof the Court. Perhaps he denies the fact charged. Perbaps he explains that the fact, as charged, was by reason of circumstances a lawful
one. The judge is not presumed to know beforehand, all the merits of the thousand and one causes that come before him; he decides when .he has heard. But the
first duty of a defendant, in all cases, is obedience to the writ which calls him into
Court. Till he has rendered this, the judge cannot hear the cause, still less pass
upon its merits."-[4 Am. Law Reg. 13. Opinion of Judge Kane.]
"There are some proceedings in which the want of jurisdiction would be seen
at the first blush, but there are others in which the Court must inquire into all
the facts, before it can possibly know whether it has jurisdiction or not. Any one
who obstructs or baffles a judicial investigation for that purpose, is unquestionably
guilty of a crime, for which he may and ought to be tried, convicted and punished.
Suppose a local action to be brought in the wrong county, this is a defence to the
action, but a defence which must be made out like any other. While it is pending,
neither a party, nor an officer, nor any other person, can safely insult the Court,
or resist its order. The Court may not have power to decide upon the merits of
the case, but it has undoubted power to try whether the wrong was done within its
jurisdiction or not. Suppose Mr. Williamson to be called before the Circuit Court
of the United States, as a witness in a trial for murder alleged to be committed on
the high seas, can he refuse to be sworn, and at his trial for contempt justify himself on the ground that the murder was in fact committed within the limits of a State, and therefore triable only in a State Court? If he can, he can justify perjury for the same reason. But such a defence for either crime has never been
heard of, since the beginning of the world.
The duty of the Court to inquire into the facts on which its jurisdiction depends,
is as plain as its duty not to exceed it when it is ascertained.-(26 Penn. Rep. 21.)

Second. As this Court must determine its own jurisdiction, the
next inquiry is as to the mode of ascertaining it. Here it is better that the views of this Court should be expressed in the language of Chief Justice MARSHALL, speaking the authoritative
conclusions of the United States Supreme Court; authority which
a United States District Court, if so disposed, cannot properly
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disregard. The doctrine, as asserted by him, no American Court
or Jurist can justly question. It is a correct and clear exposition
of the law:
"Courts which originate in the common law, possess a jurisdiction which must
be regulated by the common law, until some statute shall change their established
principles; but Courts which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is
defined by written law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction. It is unnecessary to
state the reasoning on which this opinion is founded, because it has been repeatedly given by this Court, and with the decisions heretofore rendered on this point,
no member of the bench has ever for an instant been dissatisfied. The reasoning
from the bar in relation to it, may be answered by the single observation thatfor
the meaning of the term habeas corpus, resortmay unquestionably be had to the common
law, but thepower to award the writ by any of the Courts of the United States must be
given by written law. This opinion is not to be considered as abridging the power
of Courts over their own officers, or to protect themselves and their members from
being disturbed in the exercise of their functions; it extends only to the power of
taking cognizance of any question between individuals, or between the Government
and individuals. To enable the Court to decide on such question, the power to
determine it must be given by written law." [Ex parte ]3ollman and Swartwout,
4 Cranch, 93.]

Third. That written law is found in the act of 24th September,
1789, see. 14, (commonly known as the Judiciary Act,) 1 U. S.
St. at Large, 81, and in the act of 2d March, 1833, section 7, (4
U. S. St., 634,) usually denominated the "Force Bill." The
history of each of those statutes is familiar to all, and suggestive
of profound thought. The section in the act of 1833, conferring
upon United States Judges increased power to proceed by habeas
corpus, was not by the terms of that act made temporary, whilst
many of its other provisions were expressly limited in their operation to the end of the next session of Congress then ensuing. The
grave questions which have arisen within the last ten years, as to
the scope of the powers granted to the United States Judges by
that act, will be alluded to in another part of this opinion. It is
sufficient now, to consider, first, the act of 1789.
Before analyzing this act and ascertaining its true construction, it may be well to remark, that the case of the United States
vs. -French,1 Gallison 1, (cited by counsel) decides nothing more
than was afterwards directly held by the United States Supreme
Court in ex parte .Dorr, 3 Howard, 103, viz: That when a
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"commitment" is known to be under State authority, the United
States Courts and Judges have no power to issue the writ of
habeas corpus, and hear the cause. In the case of Trilson vs.
Izard, 1 Paine, 68, the United States Court took jurisdiction
where the petitioner was restrained by authority of his enlistment
in the United States service; and similar cases occur each year.
In none of those cases is there, it is apprehended, any technical
commitment; yet in the many acts of Congress upon the subject
of enlistment, there may be, in addition to the act of 3d March,
1799, similar provisions of a special character, conferring jurisdiction upon United States District and State Judges, to hear
applications for this writ in such matters, or in cases arising under
such statutes. As time has not permitted an examination of all
those acts, to ascertain what are still in force with reference to
the discharge of soldiers from enlistment in the regular army, and
as the Judiciary Act seems perfectly clear, it is not necessary, for
the case before the Court, to pursue that collateral inquiry. If
there be no such special statutes, and Wilson vs. Izard was decided by the United States Circuit Court for New York, by virtue
of the authority granted in the act of 1789, then that case is
directly in point.
The act of 1789 seems sufficiently explicit, of itself. When the
history of this writ, and the views of those who framed the United
States Constitution and the act of 1789, are considered, there is
scarcely room for doubt. The legal controversy leading to the
American Revolution, and the persistent demand of the colonists
that they were entitled to the privileges of Englishmen, among
which they claimed that of the habeas corpus as inestimable in
value-" the inheritance of the free born subject"-would induce
the belief, that among the first acts passed by those patriotic
statesmen would be one securing those privileges to as full an extent, at least, as they had insisted upon them whilst subjects of
England. And so they did. In the Constitution they inserted a
direct prohibition against the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, "unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it"-being careful to use the
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very words they had employed during their ante-revolutionary
struggle with England-the privilege of the writ, and not merely
the writ itself. They struck deeper than the form, and insisted
upon the substance-the underlying principle-the privileges for
the vindication of which that writ had been immemorially used.
The history of the American Colonies, as well as of England, furnishes the amplest commentaries upon the part that writ has performed in every struggle for freedom.
The act of 1789 has received the deserved encomiums of all
eminent American jurists for its perspicuity and comprehensiveness-second only in those respects to the precise language of the
Constitution itself. It would be, indeed strange, if in the organization of judicial tribunals, the members of the first Congress had
overlooked the importance of that writ, or had virtually suspended
it, or fatally impaired the privileges it secures in the many and
essential cases where arbitrary authority might act without warrant, or "due process of law." And still stranger would it appear
when it is remembered, that at its first session that very Congress
proposed for adoption the first ten amendments to the Constitution, the fifth of which declares that " no person * * * * *
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law"-words which Justice CURTIS, delivering the opinion of
the United States Supreme Court in lfurray's Lessee vs. ioboken
Co., 18 How. 276, said "were undoubtedly intended to convey
the same meaning as the words 'by the law of the land' in Magna
Charta." Still, if the act of 1789, by omission or otherwise, is
as narrow in its limitations as contended for, no degree of surprise
thereat can supply its omissions or change its terms. It must be
taken as it is written, and fairly construed. The 14th section is
as follows:
"And be it further enacted, That all the before-mentioned Courts of the United
States shall have power to issue writs of scirefacias, habeas corpus, and all other
writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of
law. And that either of the Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as Judges of
the District Courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corus, for the purpose
of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. Provided, that writs of habeas corpus

IN THE MATTER OF EMMET McDONALD.
shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody under
or by color of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before
some Court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into Court to testify."
(1 U. S. St. 81.)

If there had never been a judicial exposition of that act, the
student of legal history could hardly mistake its force and effect.
The first sentence gives to the Courts all the power they possess;
and the second vests in the United States Judges all the authority
they have over the writ. It is well known how earnestly it was
once contended that the United States Courts, or at least the
United States Supreme Court, had no authority to issue the writ
"except when necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction" in
some case actually pending before it. And as the Supreme Court,
by the terms of the Constitution, has no original jurisdiction except in "cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party;" and as the
writ of liberty-the habeas corpus ad subjiciendum-canscarcely
be applicable to the exercise of its jurisdiction in any case already
before it, on appeal; and as it has no appellate power given in
criminal cases, it would have followed inevitably from that narrow construction, that it could deliver from unlawful restraint
foreign ambassadors, ministers and consuls, but no American citizen.
And still worse, upon that construction, the United States Circuit
or District Courts could never use the writ for the great remedial purposes for which it had always existed-no Federal Court
would have the needed power. Having thus construed away the
power of the United States Courts as to the most beneficial purposes of the writ, the judges of those Courts would be left at
Chambers with an authority which the Courts could never exercise, but an authority more limited than any British Judge ever
had at common law from the days of King John-even under the
worst of the Tudors or Stuarts. But the language of the first
sentence is not so narrow. The restriction has no application to
the writs of habeas corpus and scirefacias, but merely to "the
other writs" referred to. The power granted to the United States
Courts by that act is as broad as if it read: they "shall have
power to issue the writs of scire facias and habeas corpus agree-

IN THE MATTER OF EMMET McDONALD.

able to the principles and usages of law"-principles and usages
as well understood as the meaning of the words "due process of
law" in the fifth amendment to the Constitution. And so on the
trial of Burr, Chief Justice Marshall held: "The principles and
usages of law mean those general principles and usages which are
to be found, not in the legislative acts of any particular State, but
in that generally recognized and long established law which forms
the substratum of all the laws of every State."
But there is no limit to the powers of the United States Courts?
May they override all State process, judgments and decrees, and
virtually discharge prisoners in custody for violation of State laws ?
If there were no provision on the subject in the act of 1789, still
the reasonable construction would necessarily be, that the United
States Courts can take no jurisdiction beyond the range of Federal
authority-that they must confine their action within the purview
of Federal jurisdiction, and not interfere with cases belonging
exclusively to the States. But the proviso to the second section
has always been held, and with manifest correctness, to limit the
Courts as well as the Judges at Chambers. That proviso was for
the express purpose of preventing conflicts between Federal and
State authority-of confining the United States Courts and Judges
within their appropriate spheres.
On any other construction, we should have the strange anomaly
of a statute conferring upon an individual Judge at Chambers, a
power which Congress was unwilling to entrust even to the Supreme Court of the -United States, or to a Circuit Court. A
District Court, held by the District Judge alone, in open term,
could not do what the same Judge by stepping down from the
Bench, could quietly do at Chambers, and that, too,' in a matter
involving the liberties of the American people, within the purview
of the United States authority. Any fair construction of the act
of 1789, whilst extending the proviso of the second sentence to
the whole section, and forbidding Federal Courts as well as Judges
from interferring with the legitimate authority of State tribunals,
gives to both Courts and Judges power to inquire into every
" cause of commitment under or by color of the authority of the
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United States ;" not narrowing them down to cases of technical
or formal arrests by judicial process and leaving them powerless
when arbitrary will, assuming to act in the name of the United
States, choses to trample upon every constitutional guaranty for
the protection of individual liberty. If process issued from a
judicial officer of the United States government, the citizen would
have at least the assurance that such officer could not, without the
grossest and most palpable violation of his sworn duty, proceed
except by "due process of law," yet if he is left remediless where
his liberties are trodden down without any legal process whatsoever, he would be delivered over to the tender mercies of every
Federal officer who choses to outrage his constitutional rightshis "inheritance as a free-born subject."
Reference was made by counsel to contemporaneous history for
aid in construing this act. Such reference is always legitimate
where there is any obscurity in the terms employed; and so is the
other rule, also invoked, that the use of a technical term in a
statute is supposed to carry with it its technical meaning and application. If the act of 1789 is tested by these rules the same
result, already indicated, is just as clearly reached. The anterevolutionary controversies of a legal character, together with the
debates in the British Parliament upon those questions, furnish
ample light to illuminate our pathway. It is not to be supposed
that the American statesmen of the Revolution, who drafted the
Constitution and the act of 1789, were ignorant of the controversy which had just taken place in the British Parliament with
respect to this writ and its privileges; particularly as they had
petitioned and remonstrated from time to time upon the same subject. The following compendious history of that Parliamentary
struggle, if resort is had to contemporaneous events, will most
probably furnish the best guide to what was in the minds of the
First Congress when the Judiciary Act was passed:
"In the year 1757, the above act of the 31 Car. II, ch. 2, (the Habeas Corpus Act)
came under discussion, in both Houses of Parliament upon the following occasion.
A gentlemen having been impressed before tie.commissioners under a pressing act
passed in the preceding session, and confined in the Savoy, his friends made appli-

4.3

IN THE MATTER OF EMMET McDONALD.
cation for a writ of habeas corpus, which produced some hesitation and difficulty,
for according to the above statute, the privilege relates only to persons committed
for criminal, or supposed criminal matters, and this gentleman did not stand in
that predicament. Before the question could be determined, he was discharged, in
consequence of an application to the Secretary of War. But the nature of the case
seeming to point out a defect in the act, a bill for giving a more speedy remedy to
the subject upon the writ of habeas corpus was prepared, and presented to the
House of Commons. It imported that the several provisions made in the above
act 31, Car. 2, for the awarding of writs of habeas corpus in cases of commitment,
or detainer for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, should in like manner
extend to all cases, where any person, not being committed or detained for any criminal
or supposed criminal matter should be confined, or restrainedof his or their liberty
under any color or pretence whatsoever, that upon oath made by such person so confined, or restrained, or by any other person on his behalf, of any actual confinement
or restraint, to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person so applying,
was not by virtue of any commitment, or detainer for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, an habeas corpus, directed to the person or persons so confining or
restraining the party, should be granted in the same manner as is directed, and
under the same penalties as are provided by the said act in the case of persons
committed or detained for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, that the person before whom the party should be brought, by virtue of an habeas corpus, granted
in the vacation time, under the authority of this act, might and should, within three
days after the return made, proceed to examine into the facts contained in such
return, and into the cause of such confinement and restraint, and thereupon either
discharge, or bail, or remand the party so brought, as the case should require, and
as to justice should appertain. The rest of the bill related to the return of the
writ in three days, and the penalties upon those who should neglect or refuse to
make the return, or to comply with any other claim of this regulation. (See the
bill and the arguments for and against it, in the appendix to vol. 7, Debrett's Debates, from 1743 to 1774.) The bill was soon passed by the Commons, but in the
House of Lords it was thrown out at the second reading, and the Judges were
ordered to prepare a bill to extend the power of granting writs of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum in vacation time, in cases not within statute of 31 Car. 2, c., to all the
Judges of his Majesty's Courts at Westminster, and to provide for .the issuing of
process in vacation time to compel obedience to such writs, and that in preparing
such bill, they take into consideration whether in any and in what cases it may be
proper to make provision that the truth of the facts contained in the return to a
writ of habeas corpus may be controverted by affidavits of traverse, and so far as
it shall appear to be proper, that clauses be inserted for that purpose, and that they
lay such bill before the House, in the beginning of the next session of Parliament."
3 Bac. Abb. App. to Habeas Corpus.

It should be carefully observed that what thus occurred -was
almost coeval with the American struggle for Independence. The
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bill which passed the House of Commons was at first delayed in
the House of Lords until the opinions of all the Judges at Westminster Hall could be had in answer to the celebrated interrogatories propounded to them. Those answers were subsequently
made. Upon the strength of the judicial opinions thus given,
Lord Mansfield caused the defeat of the bill in the House of Lords,
upon the ground that everything proposed in the bill was already
the law just as indisputably and clearly as if that bill had ripened
into an act upon the statute books of the realm. It was thus settled, in the opinion of the British Judges and of the House of
Lords, just prior to the American Revolution, that "the privileges
of the writ of habeascorpus agreeably to the principles and usages
of law" "1extended to all cases where persons NOT being committed
or detained, &c., should be confined or restrainedof his or their
liberties under any color or pretence whatever."
But American Courts are no longer left merely to such modes of
interpretation. The opinion of the United States Supreme Court
was given upon the fourteenth section of the act of 1789 as early
as 1807, by Chief Justice Marshall. Although the main point before that Court had reference to its own character as an a)pellate
court, except in the few cases already named; yet from that day
to the present, the general views then expressed seem to have
been recognized by all Courts and Judges as putting at rest every
dispute about the extent of the power of the United States Courts
and Judges, in cases of original jurisdiction, to issue the writ and
inquire into the causes of illegal restraint where said restraint is
"under or by color of the authority of the United States." To
understand distinctly the views expressed by Chief Justice Marshall, it is necessary to keep constantly before the mind, the fact
that the Supreme Court was considering in what cases that tribunal, as an appellate tribunal, and not a Court of original jurisdiction, could issue the writ.. As the Constitution defined and limited
its powers in original cases, manifestly no act of Congress could
enlarge them; yet the act of 1789 was, in terms, broad enough to
give to that Court the same powers over this writ as to the Circuit
or District Courts, which possessed a more enlarged originaljuris-
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diction. So anxious were the framers of the act of 1789 not to
restrict the privileges of this writ, that they had seemingly given
to an appellate court original jurisdiction. Hence the Supreme
Court, defining its own powers under the restrictions of the Constitution and not under the act of 1789, limits itself to cases pending in or decided by those Courts over which it has appellate or
revisory power. It claimed a right to revise-a revisionary jurisdiction--over tribunals inferior to itself, or from whose decisions
an appeal might ultimately be to the Supreme Court. In other
cases of commitment-that is where the petitioner was imprisoned
by other than United States District or Circuit Courts, it could
not have jurisdiction because it had no appellate or revisorypower.
It followed logically that it could not issue the writ where there
-was no commitment by any Court; for there would then be no
action of a Court over which it had appellate jurisdiction, which
could come before it for revision. Hence its decisions in the cases
of Dorr, 3 How., 103; of Barry, in 2 How., 65; of Ba'rry vs.
.ercien, 5 How. 103, and exparte Metzger, in 5 How. 176, and
in re Kaine, 14 How. 103. But in 4 Cranch, 93, and 3 Peters,
201, that Court states with sufficient distinctness its views of the
case in which United States Courts of original jurisdiction, and
United States Judges, have power to act, and also the scope of
authority they possess. As the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall
in 4 Cranch, 93, is full and demonstrative, the principal portion
of it is quoted; with a repetition of the remark that the distinction between Courts of appellate and original jurisdiction must be
borne constantly in mind whilst considering it:
The only doubt of which this section [14th of Judiciary Act] can be susceptible,
is whether the restrictive words of the first sentence limit the power to the award of
such writs of habeas corpue, as are necessary to enable the Courts of the United
States to exercise their respective jurisdictions, in some causes, which they are
capable of finally deciding. It has been urged that, in strict grammatical construction, these words refer to the last antecedent, which is "all other writs not
specially provided for by statute." The criticism may be correct, and is not
entirely without its influence ; but the sound construction which the Court thinks
it safer to adopt, is, that the true sense of the words is to be determined by the nature
of the provision, and by the context. It may be worthy of remark, that this act was
passed by the First Congress of tie United State,, sitting under a constitution which
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had declared "that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended, unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety might require it." Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction they must hare
fell, with peculiarforce, the obligation of providing efflcient means by which this great
constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for, if the means be not in
existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be
enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give to all the courts the
power of awarding writs of habeas corpus. It has been truly said that this is a
generic term, and includes every species of that writ. To this it may be added'
that when used singly-when we say the writ of habeas corpus without addition,
we most generally mean that great writ which is now applied for; and in that sense
it is used in the Constitution. The section proceeds to say, that, "either of the
Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as Judges of the District Court, shall have
power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause
of commitment." It has been argued that Congress could never intend to give a
power of this kind to the Judges of this Court, which is refused to all of them
when assembled. There is certainly much force in this argument, and it receives
additional strength from the consideration, that if the power be denied to this
Court, it is denied to every other Court of the United States. The right to grant
this important writ is given in this sentence to every Judge of the Circuit or District Court, but can neither be exercised by the Circuit nor District Court. It
would be strange if the Judge sitting on the bench should be unable to hear a motion for this writ where it might be openly made and openly discussed, and might
yet retire to his chamber, and, in private, receive and decide upon the motion.
This is not consistent with the genius of our legislation, nor with the course of our
judicial proceedings. It would be much more consonant with both that the power
of the judge at his chambers should be suspended during his term, [hence, in this
case, the adjournment from the Judge at chambers to the Court in term,] than that
it should be exercised only in secret. Whatever motives might induce the Legislature to withhold from the Supreme Court the power to award the great writ of
habeas corpus, there could be none which would induce them to withhold it from
every court in the United States, and as it is granted to all in the same sentence
and by the same words, the sound construction would seem to be, that the first sentence vests thispower in all the courts of the United States ; but as those courts are
not always in session, the second sentence vests it in every Justice or Judge of the
United States. The doubt which has been raised on this subject may be further
explained by examining the character of the various writs of habeas corpus, and
selecting those to which this general grant of power must be restricted if taken in
the limited sense of being merely used to enable the court to exercise its jurisdic*
*
tion in causes which it is enabled to decide finally."

After a mastery analysis of various forms of the writ, he proceeds :
Fourth and last, common writ, adfaciendum et recipiendumr "which issues out of
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any of the Courts of Westminster Hall, when a person is sued in some inferior
jurisdiction, and is desirous to remove the action into the Superior Court, commanding the inferior judges to produce the body of the defendant, together with
the day and cause of his caption and detainer, (whence the writ is frequently denominated a habeas corpus curecausa,) to do and receive whatever the King's courts
shall consider in that behalf. This writ is grantable of common right, without any
motion in court, and it instantly supersedes all proceedings in the court below."
Can a solemn grant of power to a court to award a writ be considered as applicable to a case in which that writ, if issuable at all, issues by law, without the leave
of the Court? It would not be difficult to demonstrate that the writ of habeas
corpus cum causa cannot be the particular writ contemplated by the Legislature in
the section under consideration ; but it will be sufficient to observe generally that
the same act prescribes a different mode for bringing into the Courts of the
United States suits brought in a State Court, against a person having a right to
claim the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States. He may, on his first appearance, file his petition, and authenticate the fact, upon which the cause is, ipso
facto, removed into the Courts of the United States. The only power, then, which
on this limited construction would be granted by the section under consideration,
would be that of issuing writs of habeas corpus ad lestificandum. The section itself
proves that this was not the intention of the Legislature. It concludes with the
following proviso: "That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in goal unless where they are in custody under or by color of authority of the
United States, or are committed for trial before some Court of the same, or are
necessary to be brought into Court to testify."
This proviso extends to the whole section. It limits the powers !reviously granted
to the Courts, because it specifies a case in which it is particularly applicable to
the use of the power by Courts-where the person is necessary to be brought into
Court to testify. That construction cannot be a fair one which would make the
Legislature except from the operation of a proviso, limiting the express grant of a
power, the whole power intended to be granted. From this review of the extent of
the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus, if the section be construed in its
restricted sense, from a comparison of the nature of the writ which the Courts of
the United States would, on that view of the subject, be enabled to issue, from a
comparison of the power so granted with the other parts of the section, it is apparent that this limited sense of the term cannot be that which was contemplated by the
Legislature But the 33d section throws much light upon this question; it contains
these words : "And upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except
where the punishment may be death, in which case it shalt not be admitted but by
the Supreme or a Circuit Court, or by a Justice of the Supreme Court, or a Judge
of a District Court, who shall exercise their discretion therein regarding the nature
and circumstances of the offence, and of the evidence, and of the usages of law."
The appropriate process of bringing up a prisoner, not committed by the Court itself,
to be bailed, is by the writ now applied for. Of consequence, a Court possessing
the power to bail prisoners not committed by itself, may award a writ of habeas
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corpus for the exercise of that power. The clause under consideration obviously
proceeds on the supposition that this power was previously given, and is explanatory of the 14th section. If by the sound construction of the act of Congress the
power to award writs of habeas corpus in order to examine into the cause of commitment, is given to this Court, it remains to inquire whether this be a case in
which the writ ought to be granted. The only objection is, that the commitment
has been made by a Court having power to commit and to bail. Against this objection. the argument from the bar has been so conclusive that nothing can be
added to it. If, then, this were res integra, the Court would decide in favor of this
motion. But the question is considered as long since decided. The case of Hamilton is expressly in point in all its parts; and although the question of jurisdiction
was not made at the bar, the case was several days under advisement, and this
question could not have escaped the attention of the Court. From that decision
the Court would not lightly depart. [United States vs. Hamilton, 3 Dall. 17.] If
the act of Congress gives this Court the power to award a writ of habeas corpus in
the present case, it remains to inquire whether that act be compatible with the
Constitution. [Here the distinction is drawn between Courts of appellate and of
original jurisdiction.] In the mandamus ease (Ante vol. 1, p. 175, Alarbury vs.
.3radison,) it was decided that this Court would not exercise original jurisdiction
except so far as that jurisdictionwas given by the Constitution. Bat so far as that case
has been distinguished between original and appellate jurisdiction, that which the
Court is now asked to exercise, is clearly appellate. It is the revision of a decision
of an inferior Court, by which a citizen has been committed to goal. It has been
demonstrated at the bar that the question brought forward on a habeas corpus, is
always distinct from thatwhich is involved in the cause itself. The question whether the individual shall be imprisoned is always distinct from the question whether
he shall be convicted or acquitted of the charge on which he is to be tried; and.
therefore, these questions are separated, and may be decided in different Courts.
The decision that the individual shall be imprisoned, must always precede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this writ must always be for the purpose
of revising that decision, and therefore appellate in its nature. But this point also
is decided in Hamilton's case, and in Burford's case. If at any time the public
safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the Courts
of the United States, it is for the Legislature to say so. That question depends on
political considerations, on which the Legislature is to decide. Uintil the legislatire
will be expressed, this Court can only see its duty, and obey the laws."

Hence the Supreme Court took jurisdiction of the cause, because
the commitment had been made by a United States Circuit Court,
and therefore fell within the appellate or revisory power of the
former. It is by not attending carefully to the distinction between
aplpellate and originaljurisdiction, that the error is often made, of
supposing this decision confines United States District and Circuit
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Courts and United States Judges, to cases of technical commitments.
That this decision, properly understood, goes as far as claimed
in favor of issuing the writ where the restraint is under or by color
of the United States authority, appears by the following extract
from the opinion of the United States Supreme Court, in the case
of Watkins, (3 Pet. 201,) pronounced by Justice Story:
,, No law of the United States prescribes the cases in which this great writ shall
be issued, nor the power of the Court over the party brought up by it. The term
is used in the Constitution as one which was well understood, and the JudicialAct authorizes this Court and all the Courts of the United States, and the .Tudges thereof, to
zssue the writfor the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment. This general
reference to a power which we are required to exercise, without any precise definition of that power, imposes on us the necessity of making some inquiries into its
use according to that law, which is, in a considerabledegree, incorporatedinto our own.
The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ known to the common law,
ftle great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is in the nature of a writ of error, to examine the legality of the commitment. The English judges, being originally under the influence of the crown,
neglected to issue this writ where the government entertained suspicions which
could not be sustained by evidence; and the writ when issued was sometimes disregarded or evaded, and great individual oppression was suffered in consequence of
delays in bringing prisoners to trial. To remedy this evil, the celebrated habeas
corpus act of Charles 2d, was enacted for the purpose of securing the benefits for
which the writ was given. This statute may be referred to as describing the cases
in which relief is, in England, afforded to a person detained in custody. It
enforces the common law. This statute excepts from those who are entitled to its benefit
persons committed for felony or treason, plainly expressed in the warrant, as well
as persons convicted or in execution." [Exparte Watkins, 3 Pet. 201.]

Yet the 33d section of that act provides as follows: "Upon all
arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except where the
punishment may be death; in which cases it shall not be admitted
but by the Supreme or a Circuit Court, or by a Justice of the Supreme Court, or a Judge of a District Court who shall," &c. By
virtue of that provision the Supreme Court, in the case of Hfamilton, 3 Dall. 17, even admitted to bail the petitioner who had been,
by a District Judge, committed to jail for treason; the highest
offence known to the law, and punishable with death. It would
appear, therefore, that the privileges of this writ and the powers
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of the United States Courts under it, are greater than were those
of English Courts and Judges under the "Habeas Corpus Act,"
(31 Charles II.)-as great, in fact, as the British Judges and Lord
Mansfield contended they were, during the Parliamentary struggle
already mentioned. It would seem clear that the framers of the
act of 1789 had that struggle and its results in mind, and that such
was the opinion of Judge Story and of the United States Supreme
Court; for the Habeas Corpus act is pronounced by that Court a
mere enforcement of the common law, leaving the privileges of the
writ not to depend upon that British statute, but upon rights far
above and beyond its provisions. The views of that Court seem to
be, that in the exercise of originaljurisdiction, within the purview
of Federal authority, the Circuit and District Courts, as well as
Judges of the United States, may issue the writ and hear the
cause, in all cases where, by common law, it could have been issued
in England. In every case that has been before the United States
Supreme Court, where allusion has been made to the subject, that
extent of power has been taken for granted, as if beyond all dispute-as if it were a point too well and incontrovertibly settled to
be even called in question. Without quoting from all the authorities in favor of that view, from Hamilton's case, decided in 1795,
down to the latest allusion in Howard's Reports, it may suffice to
give the remarks of Justice Nelson in ex parte Kaine, 14 How. 146,
views from which, so far as this question is concerned, no one of
the judges dissented. Justice Nelson thought the Supreme Court
ought to take jurisdiction of the special case then under consideration, contending that a Court subject to the revisory power of the
former tribunal had given a decision which, in its appellate character, that tribunal could review. No where was the power of United
States Courts of originaljurisdiction doubted.
That case, [Hamilton's] as understood and expounded in the case of Bollmon
and Swartwout in 1807, which received the most deliberate consideration of the
Court, and to which the doctrine of Hamilton's case was applied, held that this
great writ was wi hin the cognizance of the Court, under the fourteenth section of the
Judiciary act, in all cases where the prisonerwas restrained of his liberty, "under or
by color of the authority of the United States," and no case has held the contrary since
that decision, with the exception of that of Metzger, decided in 1847, which I have
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already stated stands alone, but which distinctly admits the power and jurisdiction
of the Court in the case before us. [The case of Metzger turned solely on the
question of appellate power.] This writ has always been justly regardedas the stable
bulwark of civil liberty, and undoubtedly in the hands of a firm and indgendentjudiciary, no person, be he citizen or alien, can be subjected to illegal restraint or be deprived of his liberty, except according to the law of the land. So essential to the
security of the personal rights of the citizen was the uninterrupted operation and
effect of this writ regarded by the founders of the Republic, that even Congress
cannot suspend it, except when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety
may require it. I cannot, therefore, consent to cripple or limit the authority conferred upon this Court by the Constitution and laws to issue it, by technical and
narrow construction; but on the contrary, prefer to follow the free and enlarged
interpretation always given when dealing with it by the Courts of England, from
which country it has been derived. They expound the exercise of the power benignly
and liberally in favor of the deliverance of the subjectfrom all unlawful imprisonment ;
and when restrained of his liberty, he may appeal to the highest common law court
in the kingdom to inquire into the cause of it. So liberally do the courts of England deal with this writ, and so unrestricted is its operation in favor of the security
of the personal rights of the subject, that the decision of one court or magistrate
upon the return of it, requiring to discharge the prisoner, is no bar to the issuing
of a second, or third, or more, by any other court or magistrate having jurisdiction
of the case, and it may remand or discharge according to its judgment, upon the
same matters: 13 Mee. and Welsby, 679 ; 9 Ad. and Ellis, 731 ; 1 East. 314 ; 14 Id.
91 ; 2 Salk. 503; 5 'ee. and Welsby, 47. Upon the whole, I am satisfied that the
prisoner is in confinement under the treaty and act of Congress without any lawful
authority. I am of opinion, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpu's should issue
in the case, to bring up the prisoner."

No question was made as to the power and efficiency of the writ,
or as to the jurisdiction of any Court not restricted by the Constitution to the exercise of appellate power. The only point of difference, it will be observed, was on the appellate question.
Some of the cases cited by counsel have been overruled, and
some do not touch the subject under investigation. The case in
Paine's Reports and the case in 3 Peters have already been noticed.
In no case known and accessible to this Court, has it ever been
held that United States Courts of originaljurisdiction cannot issue
the writ where a person is held in illegal restraint under or by color
of the authority of the United States, whether there has been a
technical "commitment" or not. The opinion of Judge Betts,
cited by counsel in Barry vs. 3_ercien, 5 How. 103, was undoubt-
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edly correct. The legal proposition involved in his decision has
long perplexed both Federal and State Courts. The various
branches of that subject have, of late years, undergone elaborate
discussion, viz: Is there in either the Federal Government or in
any State Government a power, parens patriae, similar to that
existing in England, either to make appointments to charitable uses
in certain cases, or to control the custody of children, &.-and if
so in what department of government is the power lodged and to
what extent. A very different subject from that now here.
The decisions on this jurisdictional question already referred to,
though sufficient of themselves, are by no means the most pointed.
The case of the United States vs. Green, 3 Mason, 482, is passed
without especial comment, because the views of Judge Story, then
expressed on the principal point considered, were overruled in
3 How. 103, although the decision of that eminent jurist on most of
the subjects before him, at that time, are still unquestioned law.
Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean, 131, involved an inquiry into an
executive warrantunder color of the authority of the United States,
and the jurisdiction was upheld by Judge Pope. The doctrines laid
down in that case are not wholly inapplicable to the subject before
this Court; but as more direct decisions are to be found, it is unnecessary to pause for an analysis of that opinion.
In ex parte Jenkins, 2 Wallace, Jr., 535 ; ex parte Robinson, 6
McLean, 355; United States vs. Morris, 2 Am. Law Reg. 848,
and Thomas vs. Crossin, 3 Am. Law Reg. 226, the United States
Judges or Courts not only issued the writ of habeas corpus where
there were commitments by State process, but where it did not
appear on the face of the warrant that the process was under any
color of authority of the United States. That course was held by
the learned Judges who issued the writs, to be not only permissible
under the act of 1833, but to be an imperative duty. They even
went behind the terms of those warrants or "commitments," and
after proofs, aliunde, decided that as the commitments were illegal
and for acts done under the authority of the United States, it was
their duty to discharge the prisoners. True, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania questioned the jurisdiction of the United States Courts
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in such cases. But as that point is not involved here, it is not
necessary to go into any inquiry concerning the scope of the acts of
1833 and 1789 under such circumstances. Suffice it to say, that
in each instance where the Federal Courts have been compelled to
act under the law of 1833, so far as is known, they have not failed
to exercise and enforce their authority in cases similar to those just
mentioned. Judge McLean and Judge Grier, of the Supreme
Court, have given elaborate, convincing and sound decisions upon
that subject: the correctness of which Judges Leavitt, Kane, and
Miller, of the District Courts, have not hesitated to put into practical application, despite local excitement, prejudices and resistance.
In the case of the United States vs. Williamson, reported in 3
Am. Law Reg. 729, Judge Kane, of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, issued this writ
where the cause of detainer was not alleged to be under or by color
of any process whatsoever, or of the authority of the United States.
The petitioner's slaves were seized by respondent, or by a mob at
his instigation, as was charged, whilst they were passing through
Philadelphia; and were so seized without any process, commitment
or color of authority. The respondent of his own motion and by
his mere arbitrary act, interfered with and detained from their
master, his slaves whilst in transit, and as was contended, in violation of petitioner's rights under the Constitution and laws of the
United States. That pure and able Judge did not hesitate about
what his official duty demanded. The writ was issued. The respondent made an evasive if not false return, and was imprisoned for
contempt. Subsequently be applied to Chief Justice Lewis, of
Pennsylvania, for a writ to procure his discharge; one ground of
the application being Judge Kane's want of jurisdiction. Chief
Justice Lewis refused the writ. At the following term of the Supreme Court of that State, a similar application was made, fully
argued and considered, but that court also refused to grant him any
relief. Although the main point before the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania was as to the conclusiveness of the judgment for
contempt, yet it is evident from the opinions given, and the

IN THE MATTER OF EMMET McDONALD.

dissenting views of Judge Knox, that the jurisdictional question
was also duly weighed and settled. A brief extract from the opinion
of the Supreme Court of that State by Black, J., will give its general views:
"It is argued that the Court (United States District Court) had no jurisdiction
because it was not averrred that the slaves were fugitives, but merely that they
owed service by the laws of Virginia. Conceding for the argument's sake that this
was the only ground on which the Court could have interfered-conceding, also,
that it is not substantially alleged in the petition of Mr. Wheeler-the proceeding
was, nevertheless, not void for that reason. The Federal tribunals, though courts
of limited jurisdiction, are not inferiorcourts. Their judgments, until reversed by
the proper Appellate Court, are valid and conclusive upon the parties, though the
jurisdiction be not alleged in the pleadings nor on any part of the record: 10
Wheaton, 192. Even if this were not settled and clear law, it would still be certain
that the fact on which jurisdiction depends need not be stated in the process. The
want of such a statement in the body of the habeas corpus, or in the petition on
which it was awarded, did not give Mr. Williamson a rightto treat it with contempt.
If it did, then the courts of the United States must set out the ground of their
jurisdiction, in every subpoena for a witness, and a defective or untrue averment
will authorize a witness to be as contumacious as he sees fit."

Again :
"I say the writ was legal, because the act of Congress gives to the Courts of the
United States the power to 'issue writs of habeas corpus when necessary for the
exercise of their jurisdiction, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.' A
part of the jurisdiction of the District Court consists in restoring fugitives slaves ;
and the habeas corpus may be used in aid of it when necessary :" 26 Penn. Rep. 21.

Without stopping to inquire into the correctness of the reasoning
used, or indorsing it in all its length and breadth, the opinion indi-

cates how far jurists think the United States Courts can go in
upholding Federal jurisdiction over this great writ. In the act of
1850 there is no express provision on the subject, and it is well
known that one of the principal objections taken to that statute was

in consequence of that omission. If either party could come before a
Court on that writ, then the questions sought to be reached by the
objectors might be brought before the Courts in some cases, at the
place of capture. Hence that statute furnishes no explanation of

the course of Judge Kane, nor was his action based upon its provisions. As will be seen hereafter, he placed his jurisdiction on
other grounds. The separate opinion of Judge Lowrie, and the
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points of dissent by Judge Knox, (the latter to be found in 4 Am.
Law Reg. 40,) show that the question of Judge Kane's jurisdiction
in issuing the writ was fully before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Judge Knox took this ground:
"That where a person is imprisoned by an order of the Judge of the District
Court of the United States for refusing to answer a writ of habeas corpus, he is
entitled to be discharged from such imprisonment if the Judge of the District Court
had no authority to issue the writ."

Still he was not discharged. It is true, the Court put the case
mainly on another question-one sufficient to prevent his discharge-yet the jurisdictional proposition was discussed, and by the
Chief Justice upheld in favor of the United States District Court,
in that very case.
In his opinion, the Chief Justice expressed the following views:
The habeas corpus is a common law writ, and has been used in England from time
immemorial, just as it is now. The statute of 31 Car. II. c. 2, made no alteration
in the practice of the Courts in granting these writs, (3 Barn. and Ald. 420, 2
Chitty, 207.) It merely provided that the Judges in vacation should have the
power which the Courts had previously exercised in term time, (1 Chitty's Gen.
Prac. 686,) and inflicted penalties upon those who should defeat its operation. The
common law upon this subject was brought to America by the colonists, and most,
if not all, of the States have since enacted laws resembling the English statute of
Charles IL in every principal feature.
The Constitution of the United States
declares that "the privilege of a writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it."
Congress has conferred upon the Federal Judges the power to issue such writs according
to the principles and rules regulating them in other Courts. Seeing that the same
general principles of common law on this subject prevail in England and America,
and seeing also the similarity of the statutory regulation in both countries, the decisions of the English Judges, as well as of the American Courts, both State and
Federal, are entitled to our fullest respect, as settling and defining our powers and
duties.
*
*
*
*
*
Tfhe District Court
of the United States is as independent of its, as we are of it-as independent as
the Supreme Court of the United States is of either. What the law and Constitution have forbidden us to do directly on writ of error, we, of course, cannot do
indirectly by habeas corpus. But the petitioner's counsel have put his case on the
ground that the whole proceeding against him in the District Court was coram non
.judice, null and void. It is certainly true that a void judgment may be regarded as
no judgment at all, and every judgment is void which clearly appears on its own
face to have been pronounced by a Court having no jurisdiction or authority on the
subject matter. For instance, if a Federal Court should convict and sentence a

IN THE MATTER OF EMMET McDONALD.
citizen for libel, or if a State Court, having no jurisdiction except in civil pleas,
should try an indictment for a crime, and convict the party, in these cases the
judgments would be wholly void. If the petitioner can bring himself within this
principle, then there is no judgment against him; he is wrongfully imprisoned,
and we must order him to be brought out and discharged.

This case is by no means relied upon as conclusive, or as settling
the question now under consideration. It is referrpd to mainly for
the purpose of indicating the thoroughness with which the subject
has been debated, and as introductory to the masterly reasoning of
Judge Kane himself, when the whole doctrine again came before
him for judicial review. That reasoning and his construction of
the act of 1789 seem wholly incorrect, to the extent already stated
in this opinion. As to the correctness of its application in the
Vheeler case, it is not necessary to determine here. It is sufficient
if there is jurisdiction where the petitioner is under restraint "by
color of the authority of the United States," as is averred in
McDonald's petition.
The views expressed by the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, per Kane, Judge, (4 American
Law Reg. 13,) are full and conclusive, so far as our present inquiry
is concerned; and it is well to give them somewhat at length:
"The writ of habeas corpus is of immemorial antiquity; it is deduced by the
standard writers on the English law from the great charter of King John. It is
unquestionable, however, that it is substantially of much earlier date; and it may
be referred, without improbability, to the period of the Roman invasion. Like the
trial by.jury, it entered into the institutions of Rome before the Christian era, if
not as early as the times of the Republic. Through the long series of political
struggles which gave form to the British Constitution, it was claimed as the birthright of every Englishman, and our ancestors brought it with them as such to this
country. At the common law it issued whenever a citizen was denied the exercise
of his personal liberty, or was deprived of his rightful control over any member of
his household, his wife, his child, his ward, or his servant. It issued from the
courts of the sovereign, and, in his name; at the instance of any one who invoked
it, either for himself or another. It commanded, almost in the words of the Roman
edict, ' de libero homine exhibendo,' that the party under detention should be produced before the Court, there to await its decree. It left no discretion with the
party to whom it was addressed. He was not to constitute himself the judge of
his own rights or of his own conduct, but to bring in the body, and to declare the
cause wherefore he had detained it; and the Judge was then to determine whether
that cause was sufficient in law or not. Such in America, as well as England, was
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the well-known, universally recognized writ of habeas corpus. When the Federal
Convention was engaged in framing a Constitution for the United States, a proposition was submitted to it by one of the members that 'the privileges and benefits
of the writ of habeas corpus shall be enjoyed in this Government in the most expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the Legislature except
upon the most urgent and pressing occasions.' The committee to whom it was referred for consideration, would seem to have regarded the privilege in question as
too definitely implied in the idea of free government to need formal assertion or
confirmation; for they struck out that part of the proposed article, in which it was
affirmed, and retained only so much as excluded the question of its suspension
from the ordinary range of Congressional legislation. The convention itself must
have concurred in their views, for in the Constitution, as digested and finally ratified, and as it stands now, there is neither enactment nor recognition of the privilege of this writ, except as it is implied in the provision that it shall not be suspended. It stands then under the Constitution of the United States as it was under the
common law of English America, an indefeasible privilege, above the sphere of ordinary
legislation. I do not think it necessary to argue from the words of this article that
the Congress was denied the power of limiting or restricting or qualifying the
right, which it was thus forbidden to suspend. I do not, indeed, see that there can
be a restriction or limitation of a privilege which may not be essentially a suspension of it, to some extent at least, or under some circumstances, or in reference to
some of the parties who might otherwise have enjoyed it. And it has appeared to
me, that if Congress had undertaken to deny altogether the exercise of this writ
by the Federal Court, or to limit its exercise to the few and rare cases that might
peradventure find their way to some one particular Court, or to declare that the
writ should only issue to this or that class of cases, to the exclusion of others in
which it might have issued at the common law, it would be difficult to escape the
conclusion that the ancient and venerated privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had
not been in some degree suspended, if not annulled. But there has been no legislation or attempted legislation by Congress that would call for an expansion of this
train of reasoning.
"There was one other writ, which in the more recent contests between the people
and the King, had contributed signally to the maintenance of popular right. It
was the writ of scire .facias which had been employed to vindicate the rights of
property, by vacating the monopolies of the crown. Like the writ of habeas corpus,
it founded itself on the concessions of Magna Charta; and the two were the proper
and natural complements of each other. The First Congress so regarded them.
The protection of the citizen against arbitrary exaction and unlawful restraint, as
it is the essential' object of all rightful government, would present itself, as the
first great duty of the Courts of Justice that were about to be constituted. And if,
in defining their jurisdiction, it was thought proper to signalize two writs out of the
many known to the English law, as within the unqualified competency of the new
tribunals, it would seem natural that those two should be selected which boasted
their origin from the Charter of English liberties, and had been consecrated for
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ages in the affectionate memories of the people as their safeguard against oppression. This consideration has interpreted for me the terms of the statute, which
define my jurisdiction on this subject. Very soon after I had been advanced to the
Bench I was called upon to issue the writ of habeas corpus, at the instance of a
negro, who had been arrested as a fugitive from labor. It was upon the force of
the argument, to which I now advert, that I then awarded the process; and from
that day to this, often as it has been invoked and awarded in similar cases that
have been before me, my authority to award it has never been questioned. The
language of the act of Congress reflects the history of the constitutional provision.
I am aware that it has sometimes been contended or assumed without, as it seems
to me, a just regard to the grammatical construction of these words, that the construction of these words, that the concluding limitation applies to all the process of
the Court, the two writs specially named among the rest; and that the Federal
Courts can only issue the writ of habeas corpus, when it has become necessary to
the exercise of an otherwise delegated jurisdiction; in other words, that it is subsidiary to some original or pending suit. It is obvious, that if such had been the
intention of the law-makers, it was unnecessary to name the writ of habeas corpus
at all; for the simpler phrase, ' all writs necessary, ic.,' would in that case have
covered their meaning. But there are objections to this reading more important
than any that found themselves on grammatical rules. The words that immediately
follow in the section, give the power of issuing the writ to every Judge for the purpose of inquiring into the causes of a commitment. Now, a commitment pre-supposes
judicial action, and this action it is the object of the writ to review. Can it be,
that a single Judge, sitting as such, can re-examine the causes of a detainer,
which has resulted from judicial action, and is therefore prima facie a lawful one;
and yet that the Court, of which he is a member, cannot inquire into the cause
of a detainer, made without judicial sanction, and therefore prima facie unlawful.
Besides, if this were the meaning of the act, it might be difficult to find the case
to which it should apply. I speak of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjicieudum, the
great writ of personal liberty referred to in the Constitution; not that modification
of it which applies specially to the case of a commitment, nor the less important
forms of habeas corpus ad respondendum, ad faciendum, dc., which are foreign to
the question. I do not remember to have met a case, either in practice or in the'
books, where the writ ad subjicienduns could have performed any pertinent office in
a pending suit. There may be such, but they do not occur to me; and I incline
very strongly to the opinion, that if the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus
atiplies only to cases of statutory jurisdiction, outrages'upon the rights of a citizen can never invoke its exercise by a Federal Court. If such were indeed the law
of the United States, I do not see how I could escape the conclusion, that the jeal,usy of local interests and prejudice, which led to the constitution of Federal
Courts, regarded only disputes about property ; and that the liberty of a citizen,
when beyond the state of his domicil, was not deemed worthy of equal protection:
From an absurdity so gross as this, I relieve myself by repeating the words of
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Chief Justice Marshall in ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 201: "No law of the United
States prescribes the cases in which this great writ shall be issued, nor the power
of the Court over the party brought up on it.'. Whether, then, I look to the Constitution and its history, or to the words or the policy of the act of Congress, I believe that it was meant to require of the Courts of the United States, that they
should dispense the privileges of the wri of habeas corpus to all parties lawfully asserting them, as other Courts of similarfunctions and dignity had immemorially dipensed
them at the common law. The Congress of 1789 made no definition of the writ, or
of its conditions or effects. They left it as the Constitution left it., and as it required them to leave it, the birthright of every man within the borders'of the
States; like the right to air, and water, and motion, and thought; rights impreseriptible and above all legislative discretion or caprice. And so it ought to be.
There is no writ so important for good, and so little liable to be abused. At the
worst, in the hands of a corrupt and ignorant judge it may release some one from
restraint who should justly have remained bound. But it deprives no one of freedom, and divests no right."

The following year (1856) the same subject was considered in the
United States Circuit Court for California, and the opinion given

by Judge McAllister.

The petition for the writ set out, that the

petitioner (Des Rochers) was an alien, that the Supreme Court of
the State consisted of three Judges ; that two were essential for
the transaction-of business ; that the petitioner had an important
suit pending which his interest demanded should be speedily heard,

but that it could not be heard because one of those Judges (Heydenfelt) was absent from the State, and because another, the "Hon.

David S. Terry is unlawfully restrained of his liberty against his
*
*
*
and held by them in unlawful custody,
consent,
.and is not confined in any jail, nor by color of authority of any
State, or of any magistrate thereof,"
usual prayer for the writ, &c.

&c.; and closed with the

Here it was not even averred

that

the prisoner was held "under or by color of authority of the United States,"

nor that there was any technical commitment.

It

negatived the idea, however, that he was restrained by any State

authority.

The writ was granted, on the following grounds:

"It is an immediate remedy for every illegal imprisonment." I Watts 67. In a
word, whenever a person has been deprived of going when, and where he pleases,
and restrained of his liberty, he has a right to inquire if that restraint be legal,
whether it be by a jailor, constable, or private individual, 2 Ashm. 247, cited in 4
Bacon, 571. * * * * * * This great writ existed for all remedial pur-
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poses, not only anterior to the enactment of the habeas corpus act in England, but
prior to the time of Magna Charta. In the reign of second Charles, the habeas
corpus act was passed, to repel the aggressions of the Crown and its minions.
Those aggressions clothed themselves in the form of legal proceedings in the name
of the Crown, and hence the terms of the act were limited to persons confined on
criminal process. But the habeas corpus, brought by our ancestors as their birthright, to this country, was the common-law habeas corpus; that great embodiment
of a free principle, which, born with the sturdy Roman, pieserved by the free
Saxon, was so cherished by our immediate sires that they engrafted into our organic law the declaration, "that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, &c. * * * * * * The proposition, then, is established,
both by Federal and State authority, that in determining upon the nature and
character of the habeas corpus mentioned in the Constitution and Judiciary Act of
the United States, regard is to be had, not to the limits prescribed by the Biftish
statutes, but to the more liberal principles in this particular of the common law by
which it is regulated. By those principles it was issued in England to relieve any
personfrom illegal restraint.
Its operation in this country should not be less beneficent. It remains to consider to what extent the act of Congress, giving to the Federal Judiciary the power
to issue this great writ, has limited and controlled the cases to which at common
law it confessedly applies. In doing so, we must bear in mind that we are fixing
a construction which is to decide whether the Federal Courts are to extend to or
withhold from persons a great constitutional right, in many cases to which the
common law applies. No law, say the Supreme Court of the United States, prescribes the cases in which this great writ shall be issued, nor the power of the
Court over the party when brought up by it. The term used in the Constitution
is one well understood, and the Judiciary Act authorizes all the Courts of the
United States and the Judges thereof, to issue the writ for the purpose of inquiring
into the cause of commitment.
While it is evident that the proviso to the fourteenth section limits equally the
powers of the Courts and Judges, (admitted to do so by the Court in the Pasgmore
Williamson case,) it by no means follows that equalizing and restricting their
powers as to persons in jail, has denuded them of all power, where they have jurisdiction of the parties, to relieve from illegal restraint, save in cases where the
suffering parties are in jail under the authority of the United States. The proviso
simply inhibits them from sending the writ to any persons in legal custody in jail,
unless there under the authority of the United States. The alien or citizen of another State who is restrained of his liberty by lawless men, who is under no legal
restraint, has a right to aplieal to the laws of the country for relief. If in jail, or
legal custody, not under color of authority of the United States, he is remitted to
those laws which placed him there. This is, in my opinion, the true construction
of the proviso, in which I am confirmed by the action of Judge Story, and by the
opinions of the District Judge of the District Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the Supreme Court of that State. It was in
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the exercise of tbis jurisdiction that Judge Kane issued the writ in the Passmore
Williamson case.

*

*

*

*

*

*

These views are as sound law as they are

eloquently expressed. In the case at bar, the applicant is an alien resident in this
place, is not only interested in the matter to the extent that man concedes to sympathy with the oppressed, but is pecuniarily interested to a large amount. He is
not in jail, nor in any custody known to the law, but held in restraint against his
will, and in direct violation of those laws.-[1 McAllister's Rep. 68; case of Des
Rlochers.]

This bases the petitioner's right apparently on the ground that
he is an alien, interested in the liberty of the prisoner, and that
the latter is held under unlawful restraint without any State
authority. Nothing at all is said of a commitment. It is well
known that he was held by the mere arbitrary will of a mob organized under the name of a Vigilance Committee, and without any
process, warrant, or any other legal authority. It was not considered necessary to the jurisdiction of that Court, that there
should have been a technical eomnitment, norwas it so held in the
Williamson case, nor has it been in any other case where a United
States Judge acts, or a United States Court of original jurisdiction, so far as is known to this Court.
Enough has been said, it is hoped, to demonstrate that the
question of jurisdiction does not depend, in the slightest degree,
upon the fact whether there has been a formal commitment or not,
or whether the prisoner is in jail; but the sole inquiry is---thether he is.held in unlawful restraint of his liberty "under or by
color of the authority of the United States." The petition in this
case so avers in express terms, and also negatives by apt words
that he is held by any State authority or under any legal process
whatever. The case, therefore, comes fully within what is deemed
the true rule, and all correct adjudications. Whether the rule
was correctly applied by Judge Kane or Judge McAllister, it is
not important to discuss ; but it is certain, they held it to extend
much farther than there is any occasion for, to give this Court
unquestioned jurisdiction in the case now before it.
Fourth. To remove all shadow of doubt, only one step further
need be taken-that is, to determine whether the State Courts,
(as contended by counsel,) have either exclusive or concurrent
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jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has settled that
point also. It solemnly decided in 1858, that the State Courts
have no jurisdiction whatsoever where the confinement is under the
authority of the United States. The opinion is too clear and important to be omitted. It was pronounced by Chief Justice Taney.
The importance of the questions discussed by him, and the force
of his reasoning furnish ample justification, for the length of the
extract made:
" There can be no such thing as judicial authority, unless it is conferred by a
government or sovereignty; and if the Judges and Courts of Wisconsin possess the
jurisdiction they claim, they must derive it either from the United States or the
State. It certainly has not been conferred on them by the United States, and it is
equally clear it was not in the power of the State to confer it, even if it had
attempted to do so; for no State can authorize one of its judges or Courts to exercise judicial power, by habeaz corpus or otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another
and independent government. And, although the State of Wisconsin is sovereign
within its territorial limits to a certain extent, yet that sovereignty is limited and
restricted by the Constitution of the United States. And the powers of the General Government and of the State, although both exist and are exercised within the
same territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately
and independently of each other, within their respective spheres. And the sphere
of action appropriated to the United States, is as far beyond the reach of the judicial process issued by a State judge or a State Court, as if the line of division was
traced by land-marks and monuments visible to the eye. * * * * The Constitution was not formed merely to guard the States against danger from foreign
nations, but mainly to secure union and harmony at home, for, if this object could
be attained, there would be but little danger from abroad; and, to accomplish this
purpose, it was felt by the statesmen who framed the Constitution, and by the people who adopted it, that it was necessary that many of the rights of sovereignty
which tho State then possessed, should be ceded to the General Government; and
that, in the sphere of action assigned to it, it should be supreme and strong enough
to execute its own laws by its own tribunals, without interruption from a State or
State authorities. And it was evident that everything short of this would be inadequate to the main objects for which the Government was established; and that local
interests, local passions or prejudices, incited and fostered by individuals for sinister purposes, would lead to acts of aggression and injustice by one State upon the
rights of another, which would ultimately terminate in violence and force, unless
there was a common arbiter between them, armed with power enough to protect
and guard the rights of all, by appropriate laws, to be carried into execution peacefully by its judicial tribunals.

0

*

*

*

*

*

"We do not question the authority of a State Court or Judge, who is authorized
by the laws of the State to issue the writ of habeas corpus, to issue it in any case
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where the party is imprisoned within its territorial limits, provided it does not appear,
when the applhcationis made, that the person imprisoned is in custody under the authority of the United States. The Court or Judge has a right to inquire, in this mode of
proceeding, for what cause and by what authority the prisoner is confined within
the territorial limits of the State sovereignty, and it is the duty of the marshal, or
other person having the custody of the prisoner, to make known to the judge or
Court, by a proper return, the authority by which he holds him in custody. This
right to inquire by process of habeas corpus, and the duty of the officer to make a
return, grows necessarily out of the complex character of our Government, and the
existence of two distinct aud separate sovereignties within the same territorial
space, each of them restricted in its powers, and each within its sphere of action
prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, independent of the other. But
after the return is made, and the State Judge or Courtjudicially apprized that the party
is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further.
They then know that the person is within the dominion and jurisdiction of another
government, and that neither the writ of habeas corpus nor any other process issued
under the State authority can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. He is then within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States. If he has committed an offence against their laws, their tribunals alone
can punish him; if he is wrongfully imprisoned, their tribunals can release him
and afford him redress. And although, as we have said, it is the duty of the marshal, or other person holding him, to make known, by a proper return, the authority
under which he detains him, it is at the same time imperatively his duty to obey the
process of the United States to hold the prisoner in custody under it, and to refuse
obedience to the mandate or process of any other government, and consequently
it is his duty not to take the prisoner, nor suffer him to be taken, before a State
Judge or Court upon a habeas corpus issued under State authority. No State
Judge or Court, after they are judicially informed that the party is imprisoned
under the authority of the United States, has any right to interfere with him, or to
require him to be brought before them. And if the authority of a State, in the
form of judicial process or othervyise, should attempt to control the marshal, or
other authorized officer or agent of the United States, in any respect, in the custody
of his prisoner, it would be his duty to resist it, and to call to his aid any force that
might be necessary to maintain the authority of law against illegal interference.
No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority
outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court and judge by whom it is issued;
and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless
violence. Nor is there anything in this supremacy of the General Government, or
the jurisdiction of its judicial tribunals, to awaken the jealousy or offend the natural and just pride of State sovereignty. Neither this Government nor the powers
of which we are speaking were forced upon the States. The Constitution of the
United States, with all the powers conferred by it on the General Government, and
surrendered by the States, was the voluntary act of the people of the several States,
deliberately done, for their own protection and safety against injustice from one
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another, and their anxiety to preserve it in full force in all its powers, and to guard
against resistance to, or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State, is provided
by the clause which requires that the members of the State Legislatures, and all'
executive and judical officers of the several States, as well as those of the General
Government, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution.
This is the last and closing clause of the Constitution, and inserted when the whole
frame of Government, with the powers herein-before specified, had been adopted
by the Convention, and it was in that form, and with these powers, that the Constitution was submitted to the people of the several States for their consideration and
decision. Now, it certainly can be no humiliation to the citizen of a Republic to
yield a ready obedience to the laws as administered by the constituted authorities.
On the contrary, it is among his first and highest duties as a citizen, because free
government cannot exist without it; nor can it be inconsistent with the dignity or
a sovereign State to observe faithfully, and in the spirit of sincerity and truth, the
compact into which it voluntarily entered when it became a State of this Union.
On the contrary, the highest honor of sovereignty is untarnished faith; and certainly no faith could be more deliberately and solemnly pledged than that which
every State has plighted to the other States, to support the Constitution as it is, in
all it provisions, until they shall be altered in the manner which the Constitution
itself prescribes. In the emphatic language" of-the pledge required, it is to suppart
this Constitution : Ableman vs. Booth, 21 How. 515.

As then the States have no authority in the cases named, it follows inevitably that, if the United States Courts cannot proceed,
the liberties of the people are hopelessly at the mercy of all lawlessness and violence, whether exerted by the arbitrary will of one
man or many, whenever the oppressor acts under color of the authority of the United States'-a condition worse than ever known
in England since the days of Magna Charta, and wholly incompatible with the idea of civil or constitutional liberty. So far, however, is it from being true, that such is the deplorable condition of
any American citizen, the reverse is the fact. Every one who is
illegally restrained of his liberty, under color of United States
authority, has the fullest redress in the United States Courts. Not
only has he a constitutional right to apply for deliverance from illegal restraint, but it is the duty of the Court to exhaust all its power
to enforce his application.
In whatever light the question is viewed, the conclusion seems, to
this Court, to be irresistible ; and therefore, without a shadow of
doubt, it pronounces its jurisdiction in this case to be clear, positive, and ample.
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In the Common Pleas-GeneralTerm; July, 1861.
HENRY RASQUIN vs. THE KNICKERBOCKER STAGE COO ANY.
A settlement privately effected between the parties with the design of preventing
the attorney in the cause from obtaining his costs, will not be recognized by the
Court; but the attorney, on application to the Court, will be allowed to go on
and collect the costs in the action, that he may thereby secure himself.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
DALY, F. J.-This was a motion on the part of the defendant
for an order discontinuing the suit on the ground that it had
been settled between the plaintiff and the defendant. The action
ias brought by the plaintiff, to recover for the loss of service
and the expense he had been put to, in consequence of an injury
sustained by his son, arising from the negligence of the defendants' servaits, in which the plaintiff laid his damages at two
thousand dollars. The cause had been at issue for eleven months,
during which period it had been twice reached and was ready for
trial on the part of the plaintiff, but was put off on the defendants'
motion. A settlement was the.n effected between the President of
the Stage Company and the plaintiff, without the knowledge of the
plaintiff's attorney, by the defendants paying to the plaintiff three
hundred and fifty dollars, and .the plaintiff executing and delivering
to the defendants a written instrument by which he discharged
them from all claim or claims growing out of the accident, declaring
that it was the express understanding that they were not to pay
any more costs and charges of any kind than were embraced in the
above-named sum. The next day after this settlement was effected,
attorney wrote to his client, informing him that the
be on the day calendar for trial, on the foll6wing
requesting him to call for subpoenas for his witnesses,
plaintiff answered by letter, that his means did not
continue the suit, and directing his attorney to let it
rest. Though the plaintiff's attorney did not notify the defendants
that they had a claim for costs, and that they were not to settle or
compromise with the plaintiff, Mr. Clegg, one of the attorneys,
swears, that he was informed and believes, that the defendants
the plaintiff's
cause would
Monday, 'nd
to which the
allow him to
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knew of the right of the attorney to the costs of the action, and
that they combined with the plaintiff to defraud them out of their
costs; that they knew that the plaintiff was totally irresponsible,
and that they made the first overtures to him, and induced him to
act without the knowledge of the attorney, and in fraud of their
right; and as this is not denied on the part of the defendants, nor
on the part of the president, by whom the settlement was made, it
must be taken to be true.
Where a settlement is privately effected between the parties,
with the design of preventing the attorney from obtaining his costs,
the Court will, notwithstanding the settlement, allow the attorney
to go on and collect the costs in the action, that he may thereby
secure himself. The People vs. Hardenburgh, 8 Johns., 259;
Pindarvs. Morris, 1 Car., 165; Read vs. Dupper, 6 T. R., 361;
Chapman vs. How., 1 Taunt., 341.
That there was such a combination in the case is, as I have said,
not denied; but the defendants insist that before verdict or judgment the attorney can have no lien, except upon money paid into
Court; that there must be something to which his lien will attach,
and that that does not exist until the liability of the defendant or
of the plaintiff is ascertained by verdict or by the entry of judgment. They claim the rule to be that if, after verdict rendered or
judgment entered, the parties settle in fraud of the attorney's lien,
the Court will allow him to enforce the judgment to the extent of
the costs included in it, and even then only where he has given
notice to the defendant of his lien. The case of Swain vs. Senate,
5 Bos. & Pul., 99, is expressly to the contrary. In that case there
was a collusive settlement before judgment, and the attorney had
given no notice of his claim for costs; yet he was allowed to enter
judgment, and to issue a scire facias against the bail. The Court
said that it was a fraudulent attempt to deprive the attorney of his
costs, and that therefore the plaintiff's attorney ought to be at
liberty to proceed for his costs, and to recover nominal damages.
We are referred to the case of ex parte Harte, 1 Barn. &Adolph.
462, to show that where the action is for unliquidated damages,
the parties may settle, even though the attorney has given notice
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to the defen'dant not to coimpromise or settle the suit without his
consent, and in which the Court refused to aid the attorney. The
Court did notice that feature as distinguishing it from the preceding cases, which were for the recovery of a liquidated amount,
but they also put their decision upon the ground that there was no
collusion in that case. Where there is collusion, it can make no
difference whether the damages claimed are liquidated or not. The
power of the Court is not limited to cases where the action is
brought for a liquidated sum, but it interposes upon the general
principle that it is equitable and right to protect the attorney
against a dishonest combination between the parties to deprive him
of the fruits of his labor and services. The plaintiff's attorney had
a right to go on and enter up judgment for the costs, and the motion of the defendants for an order discontinuing the action was
properly denied.
A. B. Lawrence, Jr., of counsel for appellant.
Clegg &' Semler for respondent.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
PHILIP D. THOMAS vs. G. W. SNYDER.
1. A consignment was to D. B. or his assigns, "he or they paying the freight for
the said coal ;" to which was added in the margin of the bill of lading-" freight
payable to P. D. Thomas."
freight was lost.

Through the failfire of the assigns of D. B. the

The consignee stood ready to pay it on delivery, and would have

paid it to the master, but for the said order of the owner of the vessel, who was
not present to receive the amount on the delivery of the cargo.
2. Beld, that in an action for the freight by the owner of the ship against the
shipper of the cargo, it was not error for the court to instruct the jury that if they.
found the above facts their verdict would be for the defendant.

Error to District Court of Philadelphia.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WOODWARD, J.-The customary clause in bills of lading directing
the payment of freight by the consignee or his assigns is, according t6 the authorities, both English and American, a condition pro-
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cedent, intended only for the benefit of the carrier, and if he
deliver goods without receiving freight, he may recover it of the
consignor if he were owner of the goods or a shipper under a
bharter party. But the bill of lading in this case has more than
that customary clause. The consignment was to David Duncan,
New York, or to his assigns, "he or they paying freight for the
said coal at the rate of one dollar and ninety cents per ton ;" to
which was added in the margin of the instrument, "freight payable
to P. D. Thomas." These last are very unusual words in bills of
lading. They were inserted by the plaintiff's particular direct*ion,
and, taken in connection with the customary clause as above quoted,
they were meant, undoubtedly, to prevent the payment of freight
to the master of the canal boat, and to secure it to himself as the
owner of the boat.
Nor does a single one of the numerous cases cited by the learned
counsel of plaintiff in error, exhibit a bill of lading with this remarkable feature on its face. Most of them put the shipper's liability
for freight after the cargo has been delivered to the consignee, in
disregard of the clause "he or they paying," &c., upon the covenants in the charter party, and amount to no more than this-that
the master does not lose his right of recourse upon such covenants
by failing to get his freight, as directed by the bill of lading, from
the consignee. And Lord Tenterden seemed to think, in Drew vs.
Bird, 1 Moody & Mal. R. 156, that where there was no charter
party, there was no such right of recourse, and that the carrier
must collect his freight out of the consignee, or lose it. But in
Baker vs. Havens, 19 Johns. 234, and our own cases of Collins vs.
TransportationCompany, 10 Watts, 386, and Layng vs. Stewart,
1 W. & S. 222, there was no charter party, and ihe general doc"
trine was applied that the consignor or owner is liable for freight,
notwithstanding the failure of the carrier to enforce his lien under
the customary clause of the .bill of lading. But this is the full
extent of the cases. They do not decide the effect of a clause
inserted by the owner of,the vessel, which forbids the consignee to
pay freight to the master, and directs it to be paid to himself. They
do not, therefore, rule the case in hand.
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The learned judge refused -tocharge that there was nothing shown
to discharge the defendant, who was the owner and shipper of the
cargo, from liability for freight, but instructed them, "if you find
from the evidence, that at the special direction of the plaintiff,'the
provision in the bill of lading that the freight should be payable to
him by the consignee or his assigns, was inserted-that notwithstanding this provision, he made no effort to have the freight paid
to him-that he did not go on to New York to receive payment,
nor appoint an agent to receive it for him, nor give authority in
writing or otherwise, to receive the freight for him-that if Bagley
& trother, who bought the coal, were able to pay the freight in
cash contemporaneously with the delivery of the coal to them, and
would have paid it if the plaintiff had been there to receive it, or
had appointed an agent to do so; and that if Bagley &Brother failed
and became unable to pay, and in consequence thereof the freight
has been lost, your verdict may be for the defendant."
Now, we think the question was well submitted to the jury on
this summary of the facts. Through the failure of Bagley &
Brother, who were the "assigns" of Duncan, the consignee, the
freight is lost. Which of two innocent parties shall bear the lossthe owner of the coal, who was liable at law for freight, notwithing the customary clause in the bill of lading; or the owner of the
vessel, who employed a master he would not trust, and then
neglected- to be at hand at the proper time to receive the freight himself? Is it not apparent that this neglect of the plaintiff was the
cause of the loss ? The rule is, that -where a loss must fall upon
one of two innocent parties, he shall bear it whose conduct caused it.
We give the plaintiff all he can claim, perhaps more than should
be conceded, if we treat him as an innocent party. He allowed
his boat to be freighted for the New York market-he knew the
coal was sent there to be delievered to a purchaser-the bill of
lading appointed the consignee or his assignee to pay the
freight-the assignee stood ready to pay it and would have paid it
to the master but for the plaintiff's written order to pay it only to
himself-the lien was lost and the freight unpaid simply because
the plaintiff was not there by, himself or agent to receive it. In all
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this, if there was fault at all, it was his own fault. But if we say
there was no fault on his part, as certainly there was none on
Snyder's, and that they stand equally innocent, it was treating the
plaintiff with the utmost fairness to submit these circumstances to
the jury, and leaving them to decide which party should bear the
loss. This is what the Court did. The plaintiff has no reason to
complain of it.
That a party who insists on such a stipulation in a bill of lading
should be at hand, or should appoint some one to receive the freight
at the proper time and place for its payment, is not, we think, an
unreasonable rule of law. It does not clash in the least with the
authorities cited, and it is recommended by that sound rule of diligence in business which is good for every body. The Court gave
this rule to the jury in connection with evidence which made its
application necessary and proper.
The judgment is affirmed.

In the Court of Common Pleas-GeneralTerm.
GEORGE W. WILLIAMS VS. ALEXANDER H. HOLLAND, TREASURER OF THE
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY.

Where a common carrier of merchandize received from a consignor a box, and
received therefor a bill of lading in which the name of the consignee alone
appeared, and the box, upon tender to the consignee, was refused, and was subsequently stored by the carrier with a regular warehouseman, from whom it was
stolen: Held, that this did not constitute negligence on the part of the carrier,
and that he was not liable for the loss.

i. A. Griswold, for Appellant.
H. C. 'Van V7orst, for Respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DALY, F. J.-The defendants, who were common carriers, carried
a box to the place of its destination, and tendered it to the consignee' who refused to receive it. It was then safely stored by the
defendants, in the premises in which they were accustomed to store
merchandise, in the care of good and responsible parties; and
while thus upon storage, the premises were broken into by robbers,
and the box and its contents feloniously taken.
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The consignee having refused to receive the box, the defendants
discharged their contract, as carriers, by placing it upon storage,
and the warehouseman became thereafter the bailee and agent of
the plaintiff in respect to it. Fisk vs. Newton, 1 Denio, 45; Ostrander vs. Brown, 15 Johns. 39; Cairns vs. Robbins, 8 Mees. & Welsb.
258. As the property was taken feloniously, the warehouseman
was not answerable for the loss. Sehmidt vs. Blood, 9 Wend. 268.
But, it is claimed that the defendants are liable because they did
not notify the plaintiff, within a reasonable time, of the refusal of
the consignee, and that they had stored the box with a warehouseman. But it did not appear, from anything in the case, that the
defendants knew who was the owner ; and, unless they did, they
could not be expected to notify him of what they had done ; or if
they did know, it may have been, for all that appears in the case,
that he was duly notified. The name of the owner was not inserted
in the printed receipt given by the defendants. The space in which
the consignor's name is usually inserted, was left blank, and the
address of the consignee, or person to whom the box was t6 be
delivered, was the only thing contained in the receipt to indicate to
whom the property belonged. Under such circumstances, there
could be no presumption that the defendants knew that the box
belonged to the plaintiff, and that they failed to notify him.
It rested with the plaintiff to make out a case of negligence; and
all that was necessary to show it, it was incumbent upon him to
prove. He was himself examined as a witness, and if he had communicated his name and address to the defendants, when the bag
was left with them for transportation, he could have proved it. He
did not do so, and if any conclusion is to be drawn, it is that the
defendants had no knowledge of the owner until after the bag was
feloniously taken from the warehouse. As the contents of the box
were "a kit of articles or implements for gambling," there may
have been very good reasons for concealing the name of the person
in the State to whom it belonged. 2 Rev. Stat., 927, §25, 5th ed.
It is sufficient, in conclusion, to say, that the onus of showing that
the box was lost by the defendants' negligence, was upon the
plaintiff, and that he failed to show anything of the kind.
The judgment should be affirmed.

